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THE RETURN OF A CONTENT BASED STANDARD FOR
PRIVATE PLAINTIFF DEFAMATION
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.
105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985)
STEVEN T. NAUMANN*
The Supreme Court has struggled for the past two decades to deter-
mine the extent to which the first amendment limits the torts of defama-
tion.' In 1964, the Court created a constitutional privilege by requiring
public officials to show that defendants knowingly, or with reckless disre-
gard for the truth, published defamatory statements.2 The Court soon
extended this privilege to suits by public figures 3 and finally to suits by
private individuals involving issues of public or general interest.4 Three
years later, however, the Court redefined the standard of fault for suits
involving private individuals.5 Under the new standard, private plaintiffs
could recover actual damages simply by showing that the false state-
ments were published negligently. 6 Courts denied recovery of presumed
and punitive damages, however, unless the plaintiff could show actual
malice.
7
In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. ,8 the Court
considered a defamation case involving a false credit report which was
not distributed to the general public. The Court held that speech involv-
* B.S., 1971, M. Eng'g, 1972, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; Candidate for J.D., IIT Chi-
cago-Kent College of Law, 1988.
1. Defamation consists of two torts, libel and slander. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEE-
TON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 771 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. Libel generally was in written form while slander was oral. Id.
§ 112, at 786. With the widespread use of television and radio, some authorities refer to defamation
by these media as defamacast. See ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 13, at 85-86 (1978).
The modem distinction between libel (including defamacast) and slander focuses on the potential for
harm of the communications media. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 (1977); EL-
DREDGE, supra § 13, at 86.
2. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). The New York Times Court
referred to this standard of fault as actual malice. Id. at 280. The New York Times standard is
actually a change in the plaintiffs burden of proof rather than a privilege. Defendants must plead a
privilege as an affirmative defense. ELDREDGE, supra note 1 § 53, at 293.
3. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
4. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
5. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
6. Id. at 347.
7. Id. at 349.
8. 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
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ing a "purely private concern" deserved less protection than speech in-
volving "matters of public concern." 9 According to the Court, plaintiffs
in such situations could recover presumed and punitive damages without
proof of actual malice.)0
This Comment will first analyze the development of the first amend-
ment constitutional privilege in defamation suits. The focus will then
shift to the history of the Greenmoss litigation and how the Supreme
Court arrived at its ruling. The analysis will discuss problems in apply-
ing the Greenmoss standard, suggest alternate grounds for arriving at the
decision, and recommend that the Court articulate a standard for puni-
tive damage awards. Finally, this comment will discuss the effect of
Greenmoss on future defamation cases.
HISTORY OF DEFAMATION LITIGATION
From the Common Law to Gertz
Defamation developed according to common law rules which held
defendants strictly liable for the publication of defamatory statements.11
A defendant could avoid liability only by showing that the defamatory
statements were true or that the publication fell within one of the multi-
tude of privileges. 12 Furthermore, the courts presumed damage to a per-
9. Id. at 2946.
10. Id.
11. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 87 n.13 (Marshall, J., dissenting); PROSSER,
supra note 1 § 113, at 804.
Publication is the term of art given to the communication of the defamation to a person other
than the plaintiff. Publication is an element of the torts of libel and slander and must be alleged in
the complaint. The term is not meant to limit defamation actions to newspapers, books or other
written publications. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(1) (1977); ELDREDGE, supra
note 1 § 36, at 206-07; PROSSER, supra note 1 § 113, at 797-98.
12. PROSSER, supra note 1 § 113, at 804. Two types of privileges are available to defendants,
absolute and conditional. Absolute privileges include statements made during judicial proceedings
that are "relevant" or "pertinent" to the case. Id. § 114, at 816-17. A similar privilege is present for
legislative proceedings and for executive communications published within the "outer perimeter" of
an employee's job. Id. at 821-22. Finally, a communication made with the consent of the plaintiff is
absolutely privileged. Id. at 823.
Qualified or conditional privileges include publication in the interest of the publisher, such as
defending one's reputation against defamatory remarks of another; publication in the interest of
others, such as warning someone about a person's past conduct; publication in the common interest,
such as communication between employees in a business; publication in the public interest, such as
reporting a person suspected of a crime to the police; and publication as "fair comment" on matters
of public concern. Id. § 115, at 824-32. The qualified privilege can be lost if a defendant goes
beyond the scope of the privilege such as publishing with an improper motive, publishing a falsehood
knowingly or recklessly, publishing excessively, or publishing without a reasonable belief that the
publication is necessary to accomplish the privileged purpose. Henderson v. Pennwalt Corp., 41
Wash. App. 547, 559, 704 P.2d 1256, 1264 (1985) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 596 comment a (1977)); ELDREDGE, supra note I § 93, at 508-23; PROSSER, supra note 1 § 115, at
832-35.
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son's reputation from the publication without requiring proof of actual
injuries. 13 Juries could award punitive damages even when the defendant
did not publish the statement with actual malice.'
4
These common law rules collided with the first amendment in 1964
when the United States Supreme Court decided New York Times v. Sulli-
van.' 5 The Court concluded that errors occur during "free debate" and
that speech, even though erroneous, must be protected to provide speak-
ers with "breathing space."' 16 According to the Court, if a speaker criti-
cizing a public official was required to prove his statements true to defend
against a libel judgment, the result would be a "chilling effect" on speech
and "self-censorship" on the part of speakers.17 The Court stated that
such an effect was incompatible with the rights of free speech under the
first amendment.' 8 A public official, therefore, could not recover for def-
amation relating to his official conduct unless he could prove that the
defendant published the defamatory statement with actual malice. 19
13. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403
U.S. 29, 83 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Matherson v. Marchello, 100 A.D.2d 233, 237, 473
N.Y.S.2d 998, 1002 (1984); PROSSER, supra note 1 § 112, at 795.
Presumed damages are generally applied in libel actions known as libel per se. Some courts
required plaintiffs to plead and prove special damages when the statement was not defamatory on its
face but required knowledge of extrinsic facts to make out a defamatory meaning. PROSSER, supra
note 1 § 112, at 796 & n.37. Contra ELDREDGE, supra note 1 § 24, at 157-76.
At common law, plaintiffs were required to plead and prove special damages for slander unless
the statement fell into one of four categories. These categories qualified the action as slander per se
and damages could be presumed. Marchello, 100 A.D.2d at 236, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 1001; PROSSER,
supra note I § 112, at 788. The four categories concerned statements that a plaintiff had committed
a major crime; statements claiming that a plaintiff suffers or suffered from a "loathsome disease;"
statements which affected the plaintiff's "business, trade, profession or office;" and statements imput-
ing that a woman was unchaste. Marchello, 100 A.D.2d at 236, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 1001; PROSSER,
supra note 1 § 112, at 788-93. The last category has sometimes been modified to include accusations
of serious sexual misconduct and has been applied to statements imputing that a person is a homo-
sexual. Marchello, 100 A.D.2d at 236 n.2, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 1001 n.2. These exceptions were proba-
bly established because of the high probability that such statements would cause plaintiffs actual
harm. Marchello, 100 A.D.2d at 236, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 1001; PROSSER, supra note 1 § 112, at 788.
14. PROSSER, supra note 1 § 116A, at 845; cf Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
15. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The plaintiff was Commissioner of Public Affairs for Montgomery,
Alabama and supervised the Police Department. He sued the New York Times and four civil rights
leaders claiming that an advertisement published in the Times protesting actions by the police
against civil rights workers and demonstrators defamed him. A jury in Montgomery County
awarded the plaintiff $500,000 in general and punitive damages. Id at 256-58, 284.
16. Id. at 271-72.
17. Id. at 279. The Court noted the analogous privilege that a public official has to make
defamatory statements " 'within the outer perimeter' of his duties." Id. at 282. Together with easy
access to the communications media, this privilege allows a public official to vigorously rebut any
defamation without fear of having to defend a defamation suit.
18. Id. at 283. The first amendment only limits Congress from abridging the rights of free
speech. In 1925, the Court held that the first amendment restricts state actions through the four-
teenth amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
19. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80. The Court defined actual malice as "knowledge that
[the statement] was false or with reckless disregard of whether [the statement] was false or not." Id.
at 280. The term "reckless disregard" was further defined to require the plaintiff to show "that the
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The next extension of first amendment protection came when the
Court provided New York Times protection to defendants sued by public
figures for statements relating to their involvement in public issues and
events.20 The same policies that dictated the decision in New York Times
favored applying the actual malice standard to public figures. Like pub-
lic officials, public figures occupy positions of power and influence in so-
ciety and their conduct is thus of interest to the public. Furthermore,
public figures are able to use communications channels, both to make
their views known, as well as to reply to any adverse statements concern-
defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." St. Amant v. Thomp-
son, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). Furthermore, the plaintiff must prove actual malice by clear and
convincing evidence. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285-86.
Following the decision in New York Times, courts and commentators argued whether the con-
stitutional privilege was available to everyone or just the press. See Redgrave v. Boston Symphony
Orchestra, 602 F. Supp. 1189, 1199 (D. Mass. 1985); Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and
First Amendment Methodology, 25 UCLA L. REV. 915, 921-22 (1978); Note, Mediaocracy and Mis-
trust: Extending New York Times Defamation Protection to Non-Media Defendants, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 1876, 1877 (1982).
In New York Times, the Court extended protection to the four civil rights leaders as well as the
New York Times. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 286. The question of the extent of New York Times
protection remained because of a note in a subsequent Supreme Court case. See Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133-34 n.16 (1979); see also Stewart, "Or of the Press", 26 HASTINGS L.J.
631, 635 (1975) ("(T]he Court has never suggested that the constitutional right of free speech gives
an individual any immunity from liability for either libel or slander." (emphasis in original)). But see
Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 (1980); Davis v. Schuchat, 510
F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Professor Shiffrin reconciles Justice Stewart's statement with the decision in New York Times by
stating that the four clergymen were entitled to the same protection as the newspaper because they
published in the newspaper. Shiffrin, supra, at 922. This line of reasoning has continued to be
applied in more recent cases. Woy v. Turner, 533 F. Supp. 102 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Pollnow v. Pough-
keepsie Newspapers, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 10, 16, 486 N.Y.S.2d 11, 16 (1985).
The Court subsequently provided guidance on who was considered a public official for purposes
of this constitutional privilege. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966). The Court stated that the
public official category "applies at the very least to those ... government employees who have, or
appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmen-
tal affairs." Id. at 85 (footnote omitted).
20. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S.
130 (1967). The plaintiffs in these companion cases were a football coach for the University of
Georgia, and a retired army general who had commanded the federal troops in 1957 during the
school desegregation problems in Little Rock, Arkansas. Butts, 388 U.S. at 130, 140 (opinion of
Harlan, J.).
In Butts, the defamatory article stated that Butts conspired with the coach of the University of
Alabama to fix a football game. Id. at 135. In Walker, the Associated Press, in a news dispatch,
accused General Walker of encouraging a riot during desegregation efforts at the University of Mis-
sissippi and leading the rioters charging against federal marshals. Id. at 140.
Justice Harlan joined by Justices Clark, Stewart and Fortas annunciated a lower standard for
public figures which required a showing of "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme
departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible
publishers." Id. at 133, 155.
Chief Justice Warren, however, stated that the New York Times standard was applicable to
public figures. Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring). Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan and White
concurred with the Chief Justice's reasoning. Id. at 170 (Black, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part); id. at 172 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 336 n.7 (1974). For the Court's definition of a public figure see infra note 29.
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ing their policies. 21
In 1971, the Court further extended New York Times protection in
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. ,22 to include protection from defamation
actions initiated by private individuals involved in events of "public or
general interest."' 23  Justice Brennan, in a plurality opinion, stated that
first amendment protection extended to matters of public interest and
that the event, not the participant, was the focus. 24 The plurality noted
that a distinction between public and private plaintiffs could lead to chil-
ling of speech on public issues involving private plaintiffs while providing
unwarranted protection for discussion of the non-public lives of public
figures.
25
Three years later in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. ,26 the Court rejected
21. Butts, 388 U.S. at 162-65 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
22. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
23. Id. at 44 (opinion of Brennan, J.). The event of public or general interest was the arrest of
the plaintiff, a distributor of nudist magazines, during a police attempt to enforce Philadelphia's
obscenity laws. Mr. Rosenbloom was arrested while delivering magazines at the time police were
arresting a newsstand operator. The defendant, a Philadelphia radio station, reported that the police
confiscated "3000 obscene books" from the plaintiff's barn. A second broadcast did not refer to the
plaintiff by name but referred to a distributor of smut literature. Id. at 32-35. Mr. Rosenbloom was
acquitted of the obscenity charges after the trial judge stated, as a matter of law, that the magazines
were not obscene. Mr. Rosenbloom then filed suit for libel in federal court. Id. at 36. The jury
awarded Mr. Rosenbloom $25,000 in general damages and $725,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 40.
The award of punitive damages was reduced to $250,000 by the district court. Id.
24. Id. at 42-43. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("[W]e consider
this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open ...."). The term "public or general
interest" came from Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 214 (1890).
Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 31 n.2.
Justice Black would have provided the press with absolute immunity from libel actions. Id. at
57 (Black, J., concurring). Justice White concurred that the New York Times standard applied be-
cause Mr. Rosenbloom was "involved in or affected by the official action" of public officials. Id. at
61-62 (White, J., concurring). These diverse opinions resulted in confusion in the lower courts. See
infra note 106.
The three dissenters believed that the "general or public interest" standard for New York Times
protection would require courts to determine which issues were subjects of public interest or concern
and "somehow pass on the legitimacy of interest in a particular event." Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 78-
79 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the dissenters objected to the loss of predictability and
certainty of requiring courts to make ad hoc determinations of the public interest of a particular
event. Id. at 63 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 81 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall would
have reduced any chilling effect on speakers in suits by private plaintiffs involved in activities of
general or public interest by limiting awards to actual damages. Id. at 84. He would also have
allowed states to choose any standard of fault as long as they did not impose strict liability. Id. at
86-87.
Justice Harlan would have allowed punitive damages only if actual malice was proved. Id. at 73
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Like Justice Marshall, he would also have required a plaintiff to show fault
to recover for actual damages. Id. at 64, 69.
Justice Douglas did not take part in the decision. Id. at 57.
25. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 48 (opinion of Brennan, J.). The plurality specifically noted, how-
ever, that the Court was not deciding what constitutional standard was required for events not of
general or public interest. Id. at 44 n.12, 48 n.17.
26. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The defamatory publication in Gertz was an article in the American
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the Rosenbloom general or public interest standard. The majority em-
phasized that states have legitimate interests in protecting individuals'
reputations and that the Court should give this interest great weight.
27
They stated that protection of individuals' reputations conflicts with the
need to avoid self-censorship and that courts must balance both inter-
ests. 28 While the New York Times standard accommodated both con-
cerns when public plaintiffs29 were involved, the Court stated that private
plaintiffs were entitled to greater protection. 30 The Rosenbloom standard
did not adequately protect private plaintiffs, and in certain cases, the
standard did not protect the first amendment interests either. 3' To ac-
commodate these conflicting interests, the Gertz Court adopted two rules
Opinion which was published by an affiliate of the John Birch Society. The article at issue, published
in April, 1979, was entitled "FRAME-UP: Richard Nuccio And The War On Police."
Nuccio was a Chicago policeman who had killed 17 year old Ronald Nelson in June, 1968. The
plaintiff, a lawyer, was retained as co-counsel to represent the Nelson family in a civil suit against
Nuccio, who had been convicted of murder. Mr. Gertz attended the coroner's inquest and asked a
few questions but did not participate in the criminal case against Nuccio or talk to the press.
The article in American Opinion contained various false and defamatory statements about Mr.
Gertz including that the police had a large file on him; that he had been a member of a group which
advocated the overthrow of the United States government; that he was a "Leninist," "Marxist," and
"Communist-fronter;" that he had been a pallbearer for Jack Ruby; and that he was an officer of a
group which planned attacks on the Chicago Police during the 1968 Democratic National Conven-
tion. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527, 530-31 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226
(1983).
The jury awarded Gertz $50,000 but the trial judge granted the defendant a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict stating that proof of actual malice was required for matters of public interest.
Id. at 531.
27. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974). Despite the fact that he had joined
Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Rosenbloom, Justice Blackmun reluctantly provided the fifth
vote in Gertz to eliminate uncertainty and provide a definitive ruling. Id. at 353-54 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
28. Id. at 341-43.
29. Public plaintiffs refers to public officials and public figures. These plaintiffs must show
actual malice to recover for defamation. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
The Gertz court further defined who is a public figure. First, there are the "public figures for all
purposes'-people who occupy positions of prominence, power and influence in society. Second, are
people who "thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies." The Court also
acknowledged that it was possible, albeit rare, for a person to become an involuntary public figure.
Id. at 345. A "public controversy," however, is not the same as "all controversies of interest to the
public." Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976). For instance, the divorce of a woman
married to a member of the Firestone family was not a "public controversy." Id
Furthermore, the controversy must exist prior to the defamation. The defamation can not
create the "public controversy" and make the plaintiff a public figure when he attempts to counter
the defamation. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 134-35 (1979). Additionally, a person does
not become a public figure because events draw media coverage. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n,
443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979).
30. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343. Public persons, by virtue of their positions in society, must accept a
greater risk of defamation. Private persons, however, have not assumed this risk. Furthermore,
private plaintiffs are less able than public plaintiffs to use self help in responding to defamatory
statements. Public persons, again by their positions, have more effective access to the media for
response. Id. at 344.
31. Id. at 346. The Court noted that under Rosenbloom private plaintiffs involved in a subject
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for defamation suits by private individuals. First, the states could adopt
any standard of liability for defamation of private individuals except
strict liability.3 2 Second, private plaintiffs could not recover for pre-
sumed or punitive damages without proving actual malice. Awards
would be limited to "actual injuries" absent such proof.
33
The Gertz decision was criticized for reducing first amendment pro-
tection 34 as well as for undervaluing private plaintiffs' reputations. 35
Furthermore, Gertz did not provide the "definitive ruling" that Justice
Blackmun desired. 36 Questions remained about whether Gertz applied
only to media defendants 37 or only to events of "general or public inter-
est."' 38 Ten years later, the Court agreed to resolve some of these ques-
tions when the Court granted certiorari to consider Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.
39
DUN & BRADSTREET, INC v. GREENMOSS BUILDERS; INc
The Facts
The plaintiff, Greenmoss Builders, was a construction contractor.4°
On July 26, 1976, the defendant, a commercial credit reporting agency,
issued a "special notice" credit report to five of its subscribers. 41 This
report falsely stated that Greenmoss had filed a voluntary petition in
of general or public interest would have to show actual malice to recover for injury to their reputa-
tion. In view of the greater protection that such plaintiffs deserved, this was too severe a standard.
The first amendment interests were similarly impaired when a private individual's activities
were not related to a public or general interest issue. A defendant in such a case could be held
strictly liable for presumed and punitive damages, far in excess of actual injury. Id.
32. Id. at 347. These standards are only constitutional minimums. Pollnow v. Poughkeepsie
Newspapers, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 10, 15, 486 N.Y.S.2d 11, 15 (1985).
33. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-50. Actual injury is not limited to pecuniary losses but can include
damages to the plaintiff's reputation; humiliation; and mental anguish and suffering. Id. at 350. A
plaintiff, however, may recover for these injuries even if she decides not to recover for injury to her
reputation. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 460 (1076).
34. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 358 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 365 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Note, Defamation and the First Amendment: Protecting Speech on Public Issues, 56 WASH. L. REV.
75 (1980).
35. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 369-404 (White, J., dissenting).
36. See supra note 27.
37. See infra note 131.
38. See infra note 82.
39. 464 U.S. 959 (1983).
40. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 143 Vt. 66, 69, 461 A.2d 414, 415
(1983), affd, 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
41. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2941 (1985). The five
creditors who received the "special notice" were Aetna Insurance Company, American Express
Company, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, Howard Bank, and State Mutual Insurance Com-
pany. Brief for Petitioner at 2 n.3, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct.
2939 (1985).
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bankruptcy.4 2
A jury awarded Greenmoss $50,000 in compensatory damages and
$300,000 in punitive damages.43 The trial judge had told the jury that
the "special notice" was libelous per se, and that damages therefore,
could be presumed. 44 The judge subsequently concluded that his jury in-
structions did not comply with the requirements of Gertz and granted
Dun & Bradstreet a new trial.
4 5
The Vermont Supreme Court Decision
The issue facing the Vermont Supreme Court was whether the con-
stitutional protection outlined in Gertz applied to non-media defend-
ants.46  The court rejected constitutional protection for non-media
defendants stating that such cases did not present substantial first amend-
42. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2941. In fact, one of the plaintifrs former employees, not Green-
moss, had filed the bankruptcy petition. Greenmoss, 143 Vt. at 71, 461 A.2d at 416.
John Flanagan, the president of Greenmoss learned of this credit report on July 26, 1976, while
meeting with a representative of his primary creditor, the Howard Bank, to explore additional fi-
nancing. Id. at 70, 461 A.2d at 416. He called the defendant's regional office in Manchester, New
Hampshire, and told the regional supervisor of the error in the earlier report. Mr. Flanagan re-
quested a correction be sent out immediately, and he also demanded a list of the subscribers who
received the erroneous report. He wished to contact these creditors directly and emphasize person-
ally that the July 26 report had been in error. Id. at 71, 461 A.2d at 416.
On August 3, 1976, the defendant issued a "corrective notice" to the five creditors, but refused
to supply Greenmoss with their names. Id. The plaintiff then told Dun & Bradstreet that it was not
satisfied with the correction notice and once more requested the names of the five creditors who
received the July 26 report. The defendant also refused this request. Id. at 71-72, 461 A.2d at 416.
Flanagan's main objection to the correct notice was that Dun & Bradstreet had not stated that it was
responsible for the erroneous bankruptcy report. Id. Greenmoss stopped providing Dun & Brad-
street with data and Dun & Bradstreet then issued a "blank rating" on Greenmoss. Id. at 72, 461
A.2d at 416. Howard Bank delayed consideration of the additional financing for Greenmoss until
the credit report dispute was resolved and eventually refused to make further loans. Id. at 71, 461
A.2d at 416. Dun & Bradstreet, however, introduced testimony at trial that additional loans to
Greenmoss were turned down because two senior officers who had not seen the "special notice"
decided that Greenmoss' debt to worth ratio was too high. Brief for Petitioner at 5 & n.6, Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
43. Greenmoss, 143 Vt. at 69, 461 A.2d at 415. Dun & Bradstreet claimed that the award of
compensatory damages exceeded Greenmoss' projections of actual damages by $14,000 and thus
represented presumed damages. Brief for Petitioner at 7-8, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985). Actual damages, however, may exceed pecuniary losses. See
supra note 33.
44. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2943. Additionally, the court instructed the jury that it was re-
quired to find actual malice before awarding punitive damages. Id. The trial court did not define
actual malice but the jury instruction included a definition of malice which listed terms such as "bad
faith," "inten[t] to injure," "reckless disregard of the possible consequences," as well as "knowledge
... or with reckless disregard of [the statement's] truth or falsity." Id. at n.3.
45. The trial court earlier denied the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict since the judge believed there was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to decide the issues of
liability and damages. Greenmoss, 143 Vt. at 69-70, 461 A.2d at 415. Although the trial court
granted the defendant's motion for a new trial, the judge expressed doubt that Gertz applied to non-
media cases. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2942.
46. Greenmoss, 143 Vt. at 72-73, 461 A.2d at 417.
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ment problems. Debate on public issues, discussion of self-government,
and problems of self-censorship were lacking, and therefore, a private
plaintiff's interest in his reputation outweighed any first amendment con-
cerns.47 The court also noted that the majority of states that had consid-
ered the issue had decided that Gertz protection did not reach non-media
cases.
48
THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
Justice Powell's Opinion
Justice Powell's plurality opinion49 considered three issues: first,
whether the jury instructions complied with Gertz;50 second, whether
Gertz applied to the instant case;51 and third, whether the libelous state-
ment was protected under the Court's new public concern test.52 The
plurality concluded that the trial court's instructions did not satisfy Gertz
because the term of art, "actual malice," was never correctly defined for
the jury. Presumed and punitive damages were thus awarded without
the jury finding "actual malice."
'53
The plurality stated that Gertz involved a "public issue" and that the
Court had never decided whether Gertz protection applied in cases that
did not involve "issue[s] of public concern."'5 4 To determine the degree of
47. Id. at 74, 461 A.2d at 418; see Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 279 Or. 361,
568 P.2d 1359 (1977).
The court first decided that Dun & Bradstreet was not a media defendant. The court empha-
sized that the defendant, as a commercial credit reporting agency, did not publish news to the gen-
eral public, but provided financial information to organizations that paid for such services.
Greenmoss, 143 Vt. at 73-74, 461 A.2d at 417-18.
48. Id. at 74-75, 461 A.2d at 418. Dun & Bradstreet also argued that the court should volunta-
rily extend Gertz to cover non-media defendants in the "interests of fairness, simplicity and clarity."
The court declined and further stated that credit reporting agencies were not entitled to a qualified
privilege under Vermont law. Id. at 75-76, 461 A.2d at 418-19; see Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 234
Ga. 765, 770, 218 S.E.2d 54, 58 (1975).
The court also held that under Vermont law presumed as well as punitive damages could be
awarded. Furthermore, proof of actual malice was not required for the plaintiff to receive such
awards. Greenross, 143 Vt. at 76-77, 461 A.2d at 419. The court concluded that if the jury instruc-
tions were in error, the errors favored the defendant. Id. at 79, 461 A.2d at 421.
The court subsequently overruled the portion of its opinion that allowed recovery of presumed
damages without proof of injury. Lent v. Huntoon, 143 Vt. 539, 549-50, 470 A.2d 1162, 1170
(1983).
49. Justice Powell was joined by Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2941 (1985). Chief Justice Burger and Justice White
concurred in judgment. Id. at 2948.
50. Id. at 2942-43 (opinion of Powell, J.). Finding that the jury instructions complied with
Gertz would have allowed the Court to sidestep the question of the extent of Gertz protection.
51. Id. at 2943-46.
52. Id. at 2947-48.
53. Id. at 2943. The jury instructions included many terms that were not actual malice as
defined by the Court. See supra note 44.
54. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2944. The plurality first reviewed the Court's decisions from New
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constitutional protection that should apply to statements that were of no
public concern, the plurality repeated the balancing test employed in
Gertz.55 They found the state interest in an individual's reputation un-
changed from Gertz.56 However, the plurality concluded that while pri-
vate speech was protected by the first amendment, it was not entitled to
the same degree of constitutional protection as speech on "matters of
public concern. '5 7 Citing a number of state court decisions, they deter-
mined that the state interest in individuals' reputations was sufficient to
overcome the less important interest of non-public speech. 58 Conse-
quently, the plurality held that a plaintiff involved in a matter of "private
concern" need not prove actual malice to receive presumed and punitive
damages.59
The plurality then analyzed whether Dun & Bradstreet's "special
notice" was protected as a "matter of public concern." 60 Citing Connick
v. Meyers,61 they stated that the statement's "content, form, and context"
must be reviewed to determine if the statement implicated a "matter of
public concern."' 62 The plurality concluded that for two reasons no pub-
York Times through Gertz and determined that these cases all involved "public issues." Greenmoss,
105 S. Ct. at 2943-44. New York Times involved comment on police actions in response to civil
rights demonstrations. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964). See supra note 15.
Butts concerned the issues of conspiracy to fix a football game and a political speech during an anti-
civil rights demonstration. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 135-36, 140-41 (1967)
(opinion of Harlan, J.). See supra note 20. Both matters involved public issues. Butts, 388 U.S. at
154. The holding of the plurality in Rosenbloom was specifically directed toward a test concerning
"matter[s] of public or general interest." Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44 (1971)
(opinion of Brennan, J.). The public interest involved enforcement of obscenity laws. See supra note
23. Gertz involved the prosecution of a police officer for murder. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 325 (1974). See supra note 26.
55. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2944-46; see Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343-46; see also supra note 30 and
text at notes 26-30.
56. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2944-46.
57. Id. at 2945-46. The plurality first stressed the great protection accorded speech on issues of
public concern. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978). However, they specifically stated that not all speech was entitled
to equal protection under the first amendment.
The plurality noted that on other occasions the Court had stated that not all speech was entitled
to equal first amendment protection. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2945 n.5; see Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (public utility advertising to promote the use of
electricity); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976) (advertising of drug prices); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity
speech); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words); Near v. Minnesota ex.
rel. Olsen, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (publication of troop ship departure times may be enjoined during
war time).
58. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2946. See Rowe v. Metz, 195 Colo. 424, 579 P.2d 83 (1978);
Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 279 Or. 361, 568 P.2d 1359 (1977); Denny v. Mertz,
106 Wis. 2d 636, 318 N.W.2d 141, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 883 (1982).
59. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2946.
60. Id. at 2947.
61. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
62. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2947; see Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48. Connick involved the
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lic issue was at stake. First, the "special notice" was of interest only to
Dun & Bradstreet and Greenmoss' five creditors. Second, the publica-
tion of the statement was restricted to only those five creditors and they
could not release the information to anyone else.63 In these respects, the
''special notice" was analogous to commercial speech which receives no
protection when it is false. 64
The plurality finally noted that the concern expressed in New York
Times about a "chilling effect" on speakers was not applicable to Dun &
Bradstreet's credit reports. They stated that credit reports, like advertis-
ing, were subject more to free market forces, and therefore, state regula-
tion would not inhibit this type of speech. Dun & Bradstreet issued these




In his concurrence, Chief Justice Burger agreed with the plurality
that Gertz was limited to cases involving issues of "general public impor-
tance," and, because Greenmoss concerned only private matters, Gertz
was not applicable. 66 The Chief Justice also agreed with Justice White
discharge of an Assistant District Attorney for circulating a questionnaire concerning the policies
and operations of her employer. The questionnaire in Connick addressed problems of employee
transfers; employee morale; whether an employee grievance committee was needed; whether employ-
ees had confidence in their supervisors; and if there was official pressure for the assistant district
attorneys to work for political campaigns. Id. at 141. The Court determined that the majority of the
questions were not of importance to the public for evaluating the operations of the District Attor-
ney's office since they related only to one employee's grievances over her transfer to another depart-
ment. Id. at 148. The issue of whether employees "ever fe[lt] pressured to work in political
campaigns on behalf of office supported candidates" was an area of public concern. Id. at 149.
63. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2947; see Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 926, 119
Cal. Rptr. 82 (1975). In discussing a defamatory credit report the court stated: "Credit reports do
not contain public policies or other matters of public or general concern." Id. at 934, 119 Cal. Rptr.
at 87; see also Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
985 (1974). The Hood court stated: "[M]atters of general and public interest do not include libelous
and defamatory publications of such a commercial nature as credit reports." Id. at 29.
64. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2947; see Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct.
2265, 2275 (1985); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 565-66
(1980).
65. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2947; cf. Hood, 486 F.2d at 32; Comment, Protecting the Subjects
of Credit Reports, 80 YALE L.J. 1035, 1053-54 (1971).
The plurality specifically noted that they were not holding that all types of credit reports did not
implicate issues of public concern. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2947 n.8. The plurality indicated that
the test stated in Connick of reviewing the "content, form, and context" of a statement would deter-
mine whether a particular report concerned public issues. Id. They also indicated that the use of
economic speech and advertising were to show analogies of how those types of speech receive re-
duced constitutional protection. Id.
66. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2948 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger also agreed
with Justice White's comments about re-evaluating the New York Times standard and proposed a
reasonable care standard. Id.
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that Gertz should be overruled. 67
Similarly, Justice White disagreed with the plurality's analysis of
Gertz and stated that Gertz covered all defamatory statements of private
individuals.68 Justice White then agreed with the dissent that Gertz ap-
plies to non-media defendants and that non-media speakers were entitled
to the same first amendment protections as media speakers. 69 He added,
however, that media as well as non-media defendants would be liable
under common law rules where the defamation did not involve an issue
of "general or public importance."'70 Justice White then went a step fur-
ther than the plurality and concluded that if Gertz protection concerning
presumed and punitive damages was not applicable to private concern




In his dissent, Justice Brennan first discussed Greenmoss' argument
that Gertz was restricted to media defendants. The dissent rejected this
contention, stating that while the press is protected "to ensure the vitality
of First Amendment guarantees," this does not mean that non-media
speakers deserve less protection. 72 A media/non-media distinction also
67. Id.; see also id. at 2953 (White, J., concurring).
68. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2953 (White, J., concurring); see Gertz, 418 U.S. at 370 (White, J.,
dissenting); see also Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 54 TEX. L. REV. 199, 200 & n. 12 (1976).
69. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2953 (White, J., concurring). See infra text accompanying notes
72-74.
70. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2953.
71. Id. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. In his extensive concurring opinion, Justice
White proposed to restructure the constitutional limitations on defamation by eliminating presumed
and punitive damages to mitigate the "chilling effect" on speakers. This alternative would allow
plaintiffs to vindicate their reputations and possibly receive attorney's fees. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at
2950-52.
Justice White expressed concern that the New York Times standard of liability made a public
figure's burden of proof exceedingly difficult. In Justice White's opinion, this had led to the public
being misinformed, which in turn did a disservice to first amendment ideals. Id. at 2950. He la-
mented that self help was the only method of vindication for public officials because such denials are
not as effective in informing the public about events. Id. Justice White quoted from Justice Bren-
nan's plurality opinion in Rosenbloom to emphasize the relative futility of self-help. See Rosenbloom
v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 46-47 (1971).
Justice White also expressed concern that public officials' reputations were being damaged when
a "reasonable effort to investigate the facts" could have avoided the damage. However, under New
York Times, public officials must show a knowing or reckless falsehood rather than a lack of reason-
able diligence. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2951. Justice White concluded that he saw no first amend-
ment restriction against a suit to establish that the defamatory statement was false without reaching
the issue of damages. Id. at 2950 n.2, 2952; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 391-
93 (1974) (White, J., dissenting).
72. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2958 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the Court had earlier
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creates the new problem of line drawing. 73 More important, however,
the dissent argued that it would be illogical to penalize a publisher with a
limited distribution who could cause less damage to a plaintiff's reputa-
tion, than a publication with wider circulation. 74
The dissent next attacked the limitation of Gertz to "matters of pub-
lic concern." They agreed with Justice White's understanding that Gertz
protected all false statements, whether of public importance or not.75
Assuming such a limitation of Gertz was proper, they stated that Dun &
Bradstreet's report was a matter of public concern since public knowl-
edge of bankruptcies was important for forming opinions about govern-
ment regulation of the economy. 76 The dissent also faulted the plurality
for not clearly stating what test for "matters of public concern" they
were proposing.
77
The dissent insisted that even private speech, like commercial
speech, should receive substantial first amendment protection. 7 Further-
more, the dissent noted that awarding presumed and punitive damages
excessively restricts speakers and conflicts with the least restrictive
stated in another context that the worth of speech does not depend on the identity of the speaker.
Id.; see First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978).
73. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2957 & n.6. The dissent criticized the Vermont Supreme Court's
analysis of Dun & Bradstreet as clearly a non-media defendant. Id.; see supra text accompanying
note 47; see also Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 1212, 1269 n.328 (1983). The dissent also noted
that most publishers charge for their products and furthermore, few publications are of interest to
all. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2957-58 n.6.
74. Id.; see also id. at 2953 (White, J., concurring); infra note 139.
75. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2959 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see id. at 2953 (White, J.,
concurring).
76. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2961-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the
Court had previously held that commercial speech and advertising affected areas of public interest.
Id. at 2960-61; see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976) (advertising of drug prices); see also Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (lawyer
advertising). But see note 116 and accompanying text.
77. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2959.
78. The dissent stated that commercial speech, such as advertising, that doesn't involve public
issues, receives some first amendment protection. Id. at 2962; see Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Council, 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985) (lawyer advertising); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (advertising of drug prices). But see Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) ("The Constitution ...
accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expres-
sion.").
The dissent also noted that most states provide a conditional privilege for credit reports and
that the Court should therefore follow the majority of the states and grant such a privilege as a
matter of constitutional law. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2963. But cf. Maurer, Common Law Defama-
tion and the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 72 GEO. L.J. 95 (1983).
While Professor Maurer stated that a conditional privilege for credit reporting agencies appears
to exist in most states, she also indicated that the courts' attitudes were changing. The courts were
rejecting the privilege and appear to be balancing the harm to the individual against the power of
large credit companies. Maurer, supra, at 101-03.
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means test for regulating commercial speech. 79 The dissent would there-
fore not have allowed Greenmoss to recover presumed and punitive dam-
ages since actual malice was not proved.
ANALYSIS
The Public Concern Test Is Unmanageable And Inconsistent With Gertz
Justice Powell was correct in stating that the "context of Gertz" con-
cerned a private individual involved in a public issue.80 However, the
Greenmoss plurality's interpretation is inconsistent with the majority's
reasoning in Gertz. This inconsistency between the reasoning in Gertz
and the Greenmoss statement that Gertz was meant only to cover private
plaintiffs involved in "matters of public concern" is apparent from the
language used by the Gertz Court in rejecting the Rosenbloom test.81 The
Gertz majority criticized the Rosenbloom standard as forcing judges to
make ad hoc decisions as to whether a statement concerned "general or
public interest." '8 2 However, the Greenmoss test reinstates this inquiry.
8 3
Greenmoss thus returns to a content-based standard which Gertz rejected
in favor of the target-based approach.
8 4
79. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2964. The dissent noted that a least restrictive means test would
allow compensatory damages only. Id. at n. 17. But see Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980) (test applies only to speech that is not misleading).
Since the dissent defined commercial speech as speech that "do[es] no more than propose a
commercial transaction," the dissent stated that credit reports were outside this definition and thus
not subject to the restrictions on commercial speech. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2962. But see infra
note 108 and accompanying text.
80. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2964 & n.4. The Gertz appeals court held that the theory that a
national conspiracy to undermine the police existed was an "issue of significant public interest."
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 471 F.2d 801, 805-06 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd and remanded, 418 U.S. 323
(1974).
81. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346.
82. Id. The Court stated: "We doubt the wisdom of committing this task [of deciding which
publication address matters of "general or public interest"] to the conscience of judges." Id.; see L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-13, at 640 (1978); Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 925.
Many courts and commentators had therefore assumed that Gertz applied to all private plain-
tiffs, whether or not they were involved in a matter of "general or public interest." See Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 370 (White, J., dissenting); Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine
for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1081 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 182 (1985); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 680 F.2d 527, 533 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983); Gannett Co. v. Re, 496
A.2d 553, 557 (Del. 1985); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 588-90, 350 A.2d 688, 693-94
(1976) (overruling the Court of Special Appeals on this specific issue); Harley-Davidson Motor-
sports, Inc. v. Markley, 279 Or. 361, 365, 568 P.2d 1359, 1362 (1977); Brosnahan, From Times v.
Sullivan to Gertz v. Welch: Ten Years of Balancing Libel Law and The First Amendment, 26 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 777, 791-92 (1975); Robertson, supra note 68, at 236; Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 925. But
see Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1975); cf. Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-
Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 199, 341 N.E.2d 569, 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 63-64 (1975) (liability
for defamation related to matter of public interest or public concern requires fault).
83. A commentator recently characterized this result as "ironic." Ingber, Rethinking Intangi-
ble Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 772, 839 n.327 (1985).
84. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 456 (1976); Note, supra note 19, at 1882-83.
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A second criticism the Gertz majority had of the Rosenbloom test
was that it did not adequately protect defamation defendants if a court
determined that the publication did not involve a matter of "general or
public interest."85 This concern is revived with the Greenmoss standard.
A newspaper publishing a gossip column will now have no assurance that
a court will find its publication to involve a public issue.8 6 If a court finds
no public issue, the newspaper could be liable for presumed and punitive
damages without proof of actual malice. This inadequate protection will
have a "chilling effect" on such publications.
A possible problem with returning to a content test is the loss of
certainty in what is a matter of public concern. Courts have been quick
to apply the Greenmoss test, however, these courts have not explained
why the cases did not involve matters of public concern.8 7 Although
Gertz did not entirely reject judicial determinations concerning the public importance of a plaintiffs
actions when a court decides whether a plaintiff is a public or private person for purposes of the suit.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345; see also infra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
85. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346.
86. See Buckley v. Esquire, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 1133, 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (post-Rosenbloom
decision refusing to extend New York Times protection "to include every aspect of a person's private
life.").
Since the plaintiff in Greenmoss was a private figure, the Court did not decide whether the
common law of presumed and punitive damages could also be applied to public figures not involved
in "matters of public concern." New York Times first applied constitutional protection to defama-
tion concerning the "official conduct" of a public official. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 279 (1964). However, anything that concerns a public official's qualifications is a matter of
public concern. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 76-77 (1964). For example, almost everything
concerning a political candidate bears on his fitness for office and is of public concern. Monitor
Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 273-75 (1971).
A similar argument would apply to those who are "public figures for all purposes." See Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 134
(1967) (opinion of Harlan, J.). However, courts in privacy cases have drawn limits to the extent that
public figures' lives implicate the public interest. Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 225
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (private aspects of a public figure's life do not "bear significantly upon public ques-
tions."), modified, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973); see also Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976). Courts may possibly apply the Greenmoss standards to
public figures' (and possibly some public officials') actions if the speech does not bear on a public
issue.
Less questions arise about limited purpose public figures. If they are public figures, they are so
classified for a "limited range of issues." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351. If they are private figures, Green-
moss would apply. Finally, the involuntary public figures would have to be involved in a public
event to be classified as public figures. See TRIBE, supra note 82, at § 12-13, at 643-44.
87. Davis v. Ross, 107 F.R.D. 326, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (employer writing letter about former
employee work habits); Saunders v. VanPelt, 497 A.2d 1121, 1124 & n.2 (Me. 1985) (claiming a
former coworker was discharged for incompetence); Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Ellington, 230
Va. 142, 334 S.E.2d 846, 852 (1985) (telling a former employee's coworkers that he had been dis-
charged for attempted bribery). Although the Ellington court allowed presumed damages without
proof of actual malice, for policy reasons the court still required actual malice for punitive damages.
334 S.E.2d at 852. See infra note 128.
But cf Mutafis v. Erie Ins. Exch., 775 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1985) (per curiam). In Mutafis, the
court applied the Greenmoss standard to a first amendment defense challenging an award under
West Virginia's Unfair Trade Practices Act. The defendant had placed a false and defamatory mem-
orandum in an insurance claim file. The court stated that there was "no public issue ... [the] speech
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many cases of private concern will involve commercial speech,88 this lack
of guidance leaves speakers unclear as to what constitutes a "matter of
public concern."
Although courts using the Greenmoss test may refine a method for
determining whether an issue is public or private, a review of the results
in the years between Rosenbloom and Gertz shows potential problems.8 9
For example, in Matus v. Triangle Publications, Inc.,90 a radio broad-
caster warned listeners about the high prices charged for snow plowing
but the court determined that this was not a matter of public interest.91
Conversely, in Safarets, Inc. v. Gannett Co., Inc.,92 a letter to a newspa-
per's complaint column concerning a pet store's inhumane treatment of
animals was held to be a matter of public interest.
93
A post-Greenmoss case further illustrates this uncertainty problem.
In Saunders v. VanPelt,94 the defendant was director of a child develop-
ment center which provided diagnoses and treatment recommendations
of children. He stated that the plaintiff, a psychologist who had per-
formed psychological testing of children, was "incompetent and not
qualified to work with children" and "had been dismissed... [for] in-
[was] solely in the individual interest of the speaker and was on a matter of purely private concern."
Id at 595.
The Arkansas Supreme Court, however, did not discuss the public/private concern question in
a case decided ten weeks after Greenmoss. Hogue v. Ameron, Inc., 286 Ark. 481, 695 S.W.2d 373
(1985). The lower court had directed a verdict for the defendant on the grounds that the plaintiff did
not prove actual damages. The supreme court reversed and remanded because they decided that
there was some evidence of injury to the plaintiff's reputation. However, the court did not decide the
applicability of Gertz to the case, even though the plaintiff raised the issue because the defendant was
non-media. Id. at 373-74. The defamation related to a policeman driving an unlicensed vehicle and
yelling obscenities. It could be argued that this case involved a matter of public concern-the con-
duct of a policeman.
88. For pre-Greenmoss cases involving credit reporting agencies see Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc., 486 F.2d 25, 29 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 985 (1974); Oberman v. Dun & Brad-
street, Inc., 460 F.2d 1381, 1384 (7th Cir. 1972); Kansas Electric Supply Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc., 448 F.2d 647, 649 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1026 (1972); Grove v. Dun & Brad-
street, Inc., 438 F.2d 433, 436-37 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 898 (1971); Roemer v. Retail
Credit Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 926, 934, 119 Cal. Rptr. 82, 87 (1975); see also Harley-Davidson Motor-
sports, Inc., v. Markley, 279 Or. 361, 568 P.2d 1359 (1977) (defamation by employee of one motor-
cycle dealership about another dealership). But see Davis, 107 F.R.D. at 330; Saunders, 497 A.2d at
1124; Ellington, 334 S.E.2d at 848-49 (cases all involving employment situations).
89. For a comparison of cases involving the Rosenbloom standard, see Robertson, supra note
68, at 207.
90. 445 Pa. 384, 286 A.2d 357 (1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 930 (1972).
91. Id. at 395-99, 286 A.2d at 363-65.
92. 80 Misc. 2d 109, 361 N.Y.S.2d 276 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974), affid, 49 A.D.2d 666, 373
N.Y.S.2d 858 (1975). Although Safarets was decided after Gertz, the court still followed the Rosen-
bloom standard. Id. at 113, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 280.
93. Id. at 113, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 280. For other cases held to involve the "general or public
interest" see infra note 98.
94. 497 A.2d 1121 (Me. 1985).
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competence." 95 The Maine Supreme Judicial Court noted that this case
did not "involve... an issue of public interest" but provided no analysis
to support this conclusion.
9 6
A strong argument can be made, however, that the statements were
of public concern. The statements concerned the competency of a psy-
chologist to evaluate children who were having problems in school, and
were made both to the child's parents as well as officials of the school
district. 97 Both the content and the context of the statements would thus
favor calling this a public issue. Furthermore, it is difficult to reconcile
this case with pre-Greenmoss cases in other jurisdictions holding that a
restaurant review and basketball scouting were matters of public inter-
est. 98 A decision such as Saunders will result in uncertainty and will
chill others from commenting on the competency of those who deal with
school children.99
The problems with a content based inquiry after Greenmoss differ
from any judicial determinations that have been made concerning
whether a plaintiff is a public or private figure. To determine if a plaintiff
is a public figure, a court must decide if an event is a "public contro-
versy. '" 100 While such determinations may also lead to uncertainty, there
is a major difference between the Greenmoss test and whether a "public
controversy" exists.
Under Gertz, even if a court found no "public controversy," a de-
fendant would still receive some degree of constitutional protection.101
95. Id. at 1123-24.
96. Id. at 1124 n.2.
97. Id. at 1124. The fact that the court determined that the statement did not involve a matter
of public concern did not effect the outcome of the case because the jury found actual malice. Id. at
1126-27. The court, however, relied on the fact that the statement was slanderous per se and thus
damages could be presumed. Id. at 1126.
98. See Twenty-five East 40th Street Restaurant Corp. v. Forbes, Inc., 30 N.Y.2d 595, 282
N.E.2d 118, 331 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1972); Garfinkel v. Twenty-first Century Publishing Co., 30 A.D.2d
787, 788, 291 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736-37 (1968).
99. Defamation suits are already having a chilling effect on private citizens speaking out on
what they consider to be issues of public concern. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1985, at B 11, col. 1.
Companies that sell highly specialized analyses or data bases are also concerned. Such informa-
tion, like Dun & Bradstreet's "special notice," has a limited distribution. If these companies experi-
ence a rash of libel suits, they will be forced to exercise self-censorship to protect themselves. The
Court Sends Mixed Signals On Free Speech, Bus. WK., July 15, 1985, at 40.
100. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). The Gertz Court did not define
"public controversy" but later provided some guidance. See supra note 29. One court recently relied
on the dictionary to determine whether a publication involved a public controversy or a matter of
public concern. Gannett Co. v. Re, 496 A.2d 553, 556-57 (Del. 1985) (decided before Greenmoss).
For an extensive analysis deciding whether a plaintiff was a public figure see Marcone v. Penthouse
Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1080-87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 182 (1985).
Less difficulty exists in determining the other major type of public figure-the "public figure for
all purpose." See supra note 29.
101. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-49; see Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 927.
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However, if a court now finds that a publication does not involve a mat-
ter of public concern, a defendant receives no constitutional protection
against presumed and punitive damages. 102 This uncertainty may be jus-
tified where the decision only effects the level of protection, but should
not be allowed when the decision effects whether or not a defendant re-
ceives the constitutional protection at all. 103
The Greenmoss plurality added to this problem by not defining the
term, "matters of public concer. '1°4  Furthermore, because there was
no majority opinion, no one standard represents the Greenmoss test.
Chief Justice Burger and Justice White used different expressions, "gen-
eral public importance" and "general or public importance," to distin-
guish Greenmoss from Gertz.105 This lack of a majority opinion will add
to the confusing situation because the Supreme Court has not provided
the lower courts with sufficient guidance as to the standards to be
used. 106
102. See Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2953 (White, J., concurring). Only Justice White discussed
whether the requirement of fault survives Greenmoss. See infra text accompanying notes 146-49.
103. Cf Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 927.
104. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2959 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The plurality also used the term "public issue" interchangeably with "public concern."
Id. at 2945-47 (opinion of Powell, J.).
105. Id. at 2948 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 2953-54 (White, J., concurring).
106. See Davis and Reynolds, Judicial Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974
DUKE L.J. 59, 62. Another possible result of the lack of a majority opinion may be that plurality
decisions will not be accorded full precedential value. Id. at 62. Such decisions may be limited or
overruled as new justices join the Court or concurring justices change their positions. Id. at 66.
A federal appeals court discussed the problem of applying libel law after the Rosenbloom plural-
ity decision. Gordon v. Random House, Inc., 486 F.2d 1356 (3rd Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded,
419 U.S. 812 (1974) (remand "in light of Gertz"). The court stated:
We experience some discomfort in accepting the Rosenbloom plurality opinion as a
definitive statement of the appropriate law for this proceeding .... [Wle are constrained to
observe that the affirmance of this court's judgment in [the Rosenbloom] case was pro-
duced by a majority coalition of Supreme Court Justices for diverse reasons.
Confronted with the foregoing diverse expressions, we are unable to share the cer-
tainty of the district court in accepting the Rosenbloom plurality as the law of this case.
Id. at 1359-60 (footnote omitted).
The court proceeded to discuss the effect on the law of the two new Supreme Court justices.
"Confronted with such divergence on the Supreme Court level, we suggest that the accuracy of our
'prophecies' will depend upon the yet unarticulated First Amendment philosophies of Justices Pow-
ell and Rehnquist." Id. at 1360.
A note in a post-Greenmoss opinion further illustrates the problem. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts stated: "five Justices appear to take the view that private parties need not
prove actual malice in order to recover presumed or punitive damages if the libelous matter is not
one 'of public concern.'" New England Tractor-Trailer v. Globe Newspaper Co., 395 Mass. 471,
477 n.4, 480 N.E.2d 1005, 1009 n.4 (1985) (emphasis added).
Even if the term "public concern" is accepted as the standard, the plurality did not make clear
whether this term is different from the old Rosenbloom "general or public interest" standard. The
plurality in a carefully worded opinion, did not use the term "general or public interest." There are
two possible explanations for this omission. First, the plurality wanted to avoid the criticism of
requiring judges to decide whether an issue was in the "general or public interest"-an action criti-
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The Credit Reports Should Receive Less First Amendment Protection
As an alternative to creating a public concern test with its accompa-
nying uncertainty, the Court could have held that commercial credit re-
ports, like other commercial speech, were entitled to less first amendment
protection. Although the Court has not fully defined what speech other
than advertising is considered commercial speech, 07 the Court has pro-
vided some guidance by defining commercial speech as "expression re-
lated solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience."' 08
Commercial credit information, and in particular Dun & Bradstreet's
"special notice" fits this definition.10 9
The Court has often stated that commercial speech, although enti-
tled to some first amendment protection, is not protected at the same
level as other speech' 10 and that the government may ban commercial
speech that is "false, deceptive or misleading." '' One reason for al-
lowing such government regulation is that the truth of commercial
speech may be more easily verified than other speech. Furthermore, the
free market provides incentives for such speech to be truthful, thus elimi-
nating the "chilling effect" of government regulation." 2
cized in Gertz See supra note 82 and accompanying text. Second, they may have intended that the
term "public concern" mean something entirely different. Possibly the plurality would define an
issue of "public concern" as one of greater importance than a matter of "general or public interest"
but less important than a "public controversy."
These standards, however, appear to be the same as the Supreme Court, as well as state and
lower federal courts, have equated the terms "public concern" and "public interest" prior to Green-
moss. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979) (describing the Rosenbloom
standard as applying to "matters of public or general concern"); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
403 U.S. 29, 44 (1971) (opinion of Brennan, J.); Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754
F.2d 1072, 1081 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 182 (1985); Oberman v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.,
460 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1972); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976);
Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61
(1975); Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 279 Or. 361, 568 P.2d 1359 (1977); Matus v.
Triangle Publications, Inc., 445 Pa. 384, 286 A.2d 357 (1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 930 (1972).
Justice Brennan evidently believes issues of "public concern" and "matters of public or general
interest" are identical. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2959 n. 11.
Two post-Greenmoss courts also appear to equate the terms. Saunders v. Van Pelt, 497 A.2d
1121, 1124 & n.2 (Me. 1985); Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Ellington, 230 Va. 142, 334 S.E.2d 846,
852 (1985).
107. See Shiffrin, supra note 73, at 1223; cf Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S.
Ct. 2265, 2275 (1985).
108. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
109. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2947 (1985).
110. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2275 (1985); Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Product Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1983); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203-04 (1982);
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980); Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
111. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2275; cf Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
112. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771 n.24 (1976).
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The truth of the credit information is verifiable by careful checking
of reports. 1 3 More important, however, the major purpose of issuing
credit reports is to make a profit. Recipients of these reports expect ac-
curate information and this expectation acts as an incentive to eliminate
false information.1 4 The results of applying the common law of defama-
tion to such reports will not chill speech, but will spread the cost of the
untruthful reports to the recipients from those defamed."t
5
Even if Dun & Bradstreet's reports could be distinguished from
commercial speech because they did not "propose a commercial transac-
tion," the credit reports have other attributes that result in lower first
amendment protection. The reports, by their contractual terms, were
distributed to a limited audience and had to be kept confidential."t 6 By
insisting on such terms, the credit reporting companies remove their re-
ports from the "mainstream of public discussion"' 1 7 and therefore
should not be able to claim greater constitutional protection than com-
mercial advertising. Under either theory, balancing reputation against
the reduced first amendment interests results in a return to the common
law of presumed damages."1
8
113. For example, a credit company could verify whether a firm filed a petition in bankruptcy by
checking with the company. This, in fact, was Dun & Bradstreet's standard practice which was not
observed in Greenmoss. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 143 Vt. 66, 71, 461
A.2d 414, 416 (1983), affid, 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
114. See Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 771 n.24; Shiffrin, supra note 73, at 1250.
115. Shiffrin, supra note 73, at 1250 n.247; Comment, supra note 65, at 1053-54.
116. See Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2947 (opinion of Powell, J.). The "special notice" specifically
stated the restrictions: "This report ... is not to be exhibited or its contents revealed to anyone
else." Joint Appendix at 13, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939
(1985). Lower courts have found this a significant reason to deny full first amendment protection to
such credit reports. See Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25, 29 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 985 (1974); Wortham v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 633, 639 (S.D. Tex.
1975), affid, 537 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1976).
117. Wortham, 399 F. Supp. at 638 n.2; see Mutafis v. Erie Ins. Exch., 561 F. Supp. 192, 198
(N.D.W. Va. 1983), aff'd per curiam, 775 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1985). One of the justifications for
providing first amendment protection for commercial advertising is that the best way for consumers
to make informed decisions is to "open the channels of communication rather than to close them."
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976). Furthermore, the "free flow" of information is important to society. Id. at 764. With the
restrictions on distribution of the "special notice" there is no free flow of information.
118. This is the same balancing performed by the plurality except the reduced first amendment
interest results from the specific speech and not from a general category of "private concern." See
Shiffrin, supra note 73, at 1268. While Professor Shiffrin agrees that determining which credit re-
porting agencies will not receive first amendment protection in defamation suits involves line draw-
ing, he states that such line drawing is "a far cry from sending out the judiciary on a general ad hoc
expedition to separate matters of general public interest from matters that are not." Id. at n.327.
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A Uniform Standard For Awarding Punitive Damages
Should Be Required
The primary result of the Greenmoss decision will be a return to the
common law which allowed presumed and punitive damages without
proof of actual malice.119 Protection of defendants against excessive ver-
dicts will once again depend on the common law privileges. ' 20 However,
these privileges may be overcome without proof of actual malice.' 2' The
Greenmoss decision, therefore, leaves defendants vulnerable to large dam-
age awards, especially since the plurality sets no standards for the award
of punitive damages.'
22
The plurality justified the award of presumed damages without
proof of actual malice by balancing the state interest in compensating a
person for damage to his reputation against the reduced first amendment
interest of private speech. 123 This led to the conclusion that the state's
interest in awarding presumed damages was substantial. 124 The plural-
ity, however, went through no similar balancing to justify removing con-
stitutional protection for punitive damages.
Punitive damages are windfalls made to plaintiffs in excess of actual
damages. 25 The state's interest in awarding punitive damages to plain-
tiffs is to deter as well as punish the defendant's reprehensible conduct. 26
These different interests should be balanced against the first amendment
interests to determine a standard for the award of punitive damages.
The plurality admitted that private speech was still protected by the
first amendment, albeit to a lesser degree than public speech. 27 This
protection should therefore require some constitutional limit on the
award of punitive damages. 28 If after balancing, the plurality perceived
119. See supra notes 13-14.
120. See supra note 12.
121. Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Ellington, 230 Va. 142, 334 S.E.2d 846, 853-54 (1985). See
supra note 12.
122. A recent commentator has suggested that the actual malice standard is insufficient to pro-
tect public defendants against punitive damage verdicts and that plaintiffs should be required to also
prove common law malice. Note, Punitive Damages and Libel Law, 98 HARv. L. REv. 847, 860-61
(1985).
123. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2944-46.
124. Id. at 2946. The interest in awarding presumed damages might also be substantial due to
an undervaluation problem of actual damages. See Note, supra note 122, at 857.
125. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 74 (Harlan, J., dissenting); PROSSER, supra
note 1 § 2, at 9.
126. See Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 73; PROSSER, supra note 1 § 2, at 9.
127. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2946. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
128. Justice Harlan would have restricted awards for punitive damages in private libel actions to
cases where actual malice was proved and where the amount of punitive damages was reasonably
related to the actual damages. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 73-75.
Even courts that have held that Gertz did not apply to certain cases, still applied Gertz's reason-
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that an actual malice standard was excessive for private defamation, they
should have articulated a requirement of at least common-law malice for
the award of punitive damages. A uniform requirement of common-law
malice, defined as ill will or conscious disregard for the consequences of
others, would be less restrictive of any first amendment interest than no
standard because it would not allow punitive damages based on a finding
of bad faith or refusal to retract a statement. 129 Such a standard would
simultaneously protect the important state interests. 30 Although a sec-
ond malice requirement might be confusing, a minimum standard is nec-
essary to protect speech against self-censorship, even in the private area.
The Media/Non-Media Defendant Question
Considering the large number of questions about whether Gertz ap-
plied to non-media as well as media defendants, 3 1 the Greenmoss Court
provided little analysis on the question. Only Justice White and the dis-
ing and required as a matter of state law proof of actual malice for an award of punitive damages.
See Fleming v. Moore, 221 Va. 884, 893, 275 S.E.2d 632, 638 (1981).
129. Punitive damages are allowed in Vermont on a finding of bad faith. See Greenmoss, 105 S.
Ct. at 2943 n.3. New Jersey allows punitive damages in defamation actions for failure to retract
following a written request. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:43-2 (West 1952 & Supp. 1985).
130. Since common law malice focuses on the defendant's attitudes toward the plaintiff, it is
more closely tailored toward awarding damages in cases where the defendant receives an illicit bene-
fit. Note, supra note 122, at 855. This is a better standard than the fuzzy standard in Greenmoss
where the jury could have awarded punitive damages on a finding of bad faith. See Greenmoss, 105
S. Ct. at 2943 n.3. Undervaluation problems should not occur if the court allows presumed dam-
ages. Finally, the common law malice standard furthers the retribution function because it directs
punishment at those engaged in reprehensible conduct. Note, supra note 122, at 859.
131. Holding that Gertz was limited to media defendants: Schomer v. Smidt, 113 Cal. App. 3d
828, 170 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1980); Rowe v. Metz, 195 Colo. 424, 579 P.2d 83 (1978); Retail Credit Co.
v. Russell, 234 Ga. 765, 218 S.E.2d 54 (1975); Vinson v. Linn-Mar Community School Dist., 360
N.W.2d 108 (Iowa 1984); Columbia Sussex Corp. v. Hay, 627 S.W.2d 270 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982);
Jacron Sales Co. v, Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976); Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co.,
297 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1980); Gengler v. Phelps, 92 N.M. 465, 589 P.2d 1056 (Ct. App. 1978), cert.
denied, 92 N.M. 353, 588 P.2d 554 (1979); Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 279 Or.
361, 568 P.2d 1359 (1977); Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 318 N.W.2d 141, cert. denied, 459 U.S.
883 (1982); Fleming v. Moore, 221 Va. 884, 275 S.E.2d 632 (1981); cf Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 499 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating Gertz holding applied to "media
publication").
There has been a great deal of confusion concerning the holding in Sindorf. The Supreme Court
cited Sindorf as a case holding Gertz applicable to non-media situations. See Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct.
at 2942 n. 1. The actual statement by the Sindorf court was: "It is plain that the holding in Gertz
was limited to media expression." Sindorf, 276 Md. at 590, 350 A.2d at 694. The court then decided
Gertz was applicable to non-media cases based on its prediction of a future ruling of the Supreme
Court and as a matter of state law and based on the need for equity and simplicity. Id. at 591-94,
350 A.2d at 695-96; see also Harley-Davidson, 279 Or. at 367, 568 P.2d at 1363.
The Fleming court similarly decided that Gertz did not control non-media actions but the court
was sympathetic to the policy concerns discussed in Gertz and continued to require proof of actual
malice for punitive damage awards. Fleming, 221 Va. at 893, 275 S.E.2d at 638.
Holding that Gertz was not limited to media defendant: Antwerp Diamond Exch. v. Better
Business Bureau, 130 Ariz. 525, 637 P.2d 733 (1981); see also Stewart, supra note 19, at 635. Justice
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sent discuss this issue.13 2 It is surprising that the plurality does not men-
tion this distinction because on its facts, Gertz clearly involved a media
defendant. Furthermore, as many commentators have noted, Gertz re-
ferred to the terms "media," "publisher," and "broadcaster" often.
1 33
The Court, however, has continually held in non-defamation cases
that the media have no greater first amendment rights than private citi-
zens.1 34 Furthermore, if special protection for media defendants is based
on the assumption that these statements implicate public issues,1 35 this is
also no justification. Private individuals need to discuss public issues 3
6
but they also interact throughout society and need to speak about mat-
ters that concern them. Providing less protection for non-media defend-
ants will chill not only such speech but also speech of public
importance. 37 Finally, a media/non-media distinction would not elimi-
nate the line drawing problem.'
38
Special protection for the media should also be rejected on the issue
of damages. Non-media defamation usually does not circulate to as wide
an audience as statements published in the media. The potential dam-
ages are, therefore, less. 139 Moreover, in many cases of non-media defa-
Stewart's speech, which came four months after the Gertz decision, contributed to the belief that
Gertz applied only to media defendants. See Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 924 & n.71.
The Court was concerned with the media/non-media distinction and requested arguments on
this question during reargument of the case. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
104 S. Ct. 3583 (1984).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 69, 72-74. Lack of a clear statement on this issue may
account for the Arkansas Supreme Court stating that the question of whether presumed damages
could be awarded against a non-media defendant remained open in Arkansas. Hogue v. Ameron,
Inc., 286 Ark. 481, 695 S.W.2d 373, 374 (1985). The Arkansas court never mentioned Greenmoss in
the opinion.
But cf Garcia v. Board of Educ., 777 F.2d 1403 (10th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (public official
defendant counterclaiming against non-media plaintiff). The Garcia court stated: "five members of
the [Greenmoss] Court expressly rejected a distinction between media and nonmedia defendants."
Id. at 1409 (emphasis added). The court also noted that Chief Justice Burger "implicitly ... rejected
the media/nonmedia distinction." Id. at 1410 n.5.
133. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B comment e (1977); Robertson, supra note
68, at 215 & n. 113; Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 928; Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation
of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 29 (1983); Note, supra note 19, at 1877 n.9.
Professor Shiffrin distinguishes the Court's use of the word "publisher" with its use as a term of
art. Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 928 n. 104. For the use of the word "publisher" as a term of art, see
supra note 11.
134. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777, 782, 797-802 (1978); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834-35 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
135. See Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 929; Note, supra note 19, at 1885.
136. Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276
Md. 580, 592, 350 A.2d 688, 695 (1976).
137. See supra note 99.
138. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2957 n.6, 2958 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
139. See Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 593, 350 A.2d 688, 695 (1976); Matherson v.
Marchello, 100 A.D.2d 233, 240, 473 N.Y.S.2d 998, 1004 (1984); Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1,
18, 325 S.E.2d 713, 726-27, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3513-14, 105 S. Ct. 3528-29 (1985); see also
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mation, self-help may be easier and more effective. 140 Finally, an
audience may be more skeptical of a non-media statement than one made
in the media.
Three arguments have been advanced for special media protection.
First, the media performs a public function by informing the public
about public officials, the government, and events of public concern.
14'
Second, in performing this function, the media takes a greater risk of
defaming someone and without special protection will likely engage in
self-censorship. 142 Third, some commentators have argued that since a
free press and free speech are mentioned separately in the first amend-
ment, they qualify for different levels of protection.143 Courts that have
balanced these justifications against the argument for no media/non-me-
dia distinction have rejected special protection for the media.
44
The Future of Defamation After Greenmoss
While Greenmoss answered some questions raised by Gertz, other
questions remain. Because the plurality's decision only covered pre-
sumed and punitive damages, 45 the question of whether the fault re-
quirement of Gertz remains in place after Greenmoss was never answered
by the majority of the Court.1 46 Only Justice White discussed this issue
Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 934; cf Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 649 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
982 (1980).
Professor Tribe recently stated: "It would be difficult to justify creating a special institutional
privilege for the large media... without giving a functionally analogous privilege to people with less
resources and far more vulnerability to the chilling effect of large defamation suits." N.Y. Times,
supra note 99, at col. 3.
140. See Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 934 n.140; cf Schuchat, 510 F.2d at 734 n.3.
141. See Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 932-33; Note, supra note 19, at 1884.
142. Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 933-34; Note, supra note 19, at 1884.
143. See Stewart, supra note 19, at 633, 635.
144. Sindorf, 276 Md. at 592, 350 A.2d at 695 ("[W]e [do not] discern any persuasive basis for
distinguishing media and non-media cases."); Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 18, 325 S.E.2d 713,
726-27 ("Neither policy nor reason supports different treatment of the respective types of defend-
ants."), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3513-14, 105 S. Ct. 3528-29 (1985).
145. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2948 (1985).
146. A very close reading of the Gertz Court's criticism of Rosenbloom as inadequately protect-
ing publishers for statements deemed not to involve issues of "public or general interest" may indi-
cate that the Court intended the fault standard as opposed to the damage issue, to apply to all private
plaintiff cases. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974). This interpretation would
allow the Court to reinstate a Rosenbloom type test for presumed and punitive damages without
totally contradicting the criticism of such a test in Gertz Cf. TRIBE, supra note 82, at § 12-13, at 641
("common law's strict liability for defamation was entirely displaced, at least with respect to media
defendants, by the application of Gertz's 'fault' requirement without regard to whether the statement
concerned a matter of 'public interest' ").
The majority of the Court might not have discussed the fault question for three reasons. First,
the case did not present the question and the Court could have been reluctant to discuss the issue.
Second, the Court could have been divided on the issue and simply chose to resolve this issue at
another time. Professor Shiffrin makes a similar suggestion for the Court's unwillingness to discuss
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and he stated that the fault requirement must also be restricted to cases
involving public importance. 47 Justice White would thus return to the
common law rules of strict liability for statements involving private is-
sues whether published by a media or non-media defendant. 148 Thus far,
state courts have shown no inclination to adopt Justice White's view.149
This issue ultimately will have to be resolved by the Court in the
future. 150
The other major question left by Greenmoss is what may become of
the New York Times standard? Justice White made several suggestions
to change the constitutional protection given defamation defendants.
Chief Justice Burger generally agreed. 15' New York Times has been good
law for over twenty years and it would be inconceivable to reduce protec-
tion to defendants. Recent cases have resulted in large awards of puni-
tive damages against media defendants 52 and there have been arguments
to increase, not decrease protection.
53
Justice White's suggestion to allow plaintiffs to obtain a judgment
just on the truth or falsity issue has some merit. 54 This should remove
some of the "chilling effect" which concerned the Court in New York
Times. If Justice White's proposal came to fruition, the threat of large
awards would disappear. However, there remains a question of whether
such a proposal would stand first amendment scrutiny. 155 Requiring de-
fendants to go to court to prove the truth, or disprove the falsity of each
statement, can itself have a chilling effect.'
56
the non-media question in Gertz. Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 928 n. 109. Justice Powell, furthermore,
may not have discussed the issue to preserve his plurality.
147. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2953 (White, J., concurring).
148. Id.
149. New England Tractor-Trailer v. Globe Newspaper Co., 395 Mass. 471, 477 n.4, 480 N.E.2d
1005, 1009 n.4 (1985) (dictum); see also Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Ellington, 230 Va. 142, 334
S.E.2d 846, 853 (1985) (maintaining a negligence standard without discussing Justice White's
dictum).
150. See 54 U.S.L.W. 2204 (Oct. 15, 1985) (comments by Professor Tribe at Law Week's Consti-
tutional Law Conference).
151. See supra notes 66, 71; see also Abrams, Why We Should Change The Libel Law, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 29, 1985, § 6 (Magazine), at 34, 93 (another view of suggested changes to defamation
laws); Ingber, supra note 83, at 832-39 (revised system of remedies).
152. See Tavoulareas v. Piro, 759 F.2d 90, 137 (D.C. Cir.) ($1.8 million punitive damage award
against the Washington Post), vacated, 763 F.2d 1472, 1481 (1985) (denying rehearing and granting
rehearing en banc); Smolla, supra note 133, at 12 n.72 (discussing $2.5 million punitive damage
award against the Alton (Illinois) Telegraph).
153. See Ingber, supra note 83, at 834 (elimination of punitive damages); Note, supra note 122, at
847 (public figures should be required to show common law malice as well as actual malice).
154. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2950 n.2 (White, J., concurring); see also ELDREDGE, supra note 1
§ 55.
155. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 368 n.3 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
156. A noted expert in defamation law suggests that such proposals, although they may lower
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CONCLUSIONS
In Greenmoss, a plurality of the Court concluded that presumed and
punitive damages may be awarded without proof of actual malice to a
private plaintiff involved in matters not of public concern. The plurality
held Gertz to its facts and allowed common law doctrines to cover private
speech. The plurality, however, did not define "public concern" and
Greenmoss may lead to a great deal of confusion as the lower courts try
to decide which are issues of "public concern." Greenmoss reinstitutes a
content based inquiry that was rejected by the Gertz majority and there-
fore will require courts to decide which statements implicate issues of
"public concern." If a court finds the defamation concerned private mat-
ters, defendants must rely on common law protections to limit excessive
damage awards. Additionally, a majority of the Court agreed that pri-
vate individuals are entitled to the same degree of first amendment pro-
tection in defamation actions as are the media. Finally, since Greenmoss
was a plurality opinion, the issues may be relitigated soon in the same
way Rosenbloom was revisited three years later in Gertz, especially if the
composition of the Court changes.
damage awards in individual cases, could lead to an increase in the total number of cases. Abrams,
supra note 151, at 93.
In a recent case, Israeli General Sharon sued Time Magazine for fifty million dollars. Sharon v.
Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). General Sharon claimed the primary purpose of his
lawsuit was to prove Time's statements were false. N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1985, at 26, col. 4. A jury
found the statements were false. Id. at 1, col. 4. The jury, however, did not find actual malice on the
part of Time. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1985, at Al, col. 2.
Time's costs were estimated above one million dollars. Id. at B4, col. i. An organization with
less financial resources could easily be subjected to self-censorship, even if the trial was only to
establish the truth or falsity of the issue.
The Sharon trial was also decided with a special verdict. N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1985, at 1, col. 5,
26, col. 1. This may answer some of Justice White's concerns. See Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2950 n.2
(White, J., concurring).
